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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State charged twenty-four-year-old Christopher Cruz with one count of firstdegree murder and one count of attempted first-degree murder. The State later filed a
motion in limine requesting the district court rule Mr. Cruz’s statements in certain jail
telephone conversations were admissible. After conducting a hearing, the district court
determined the seven phone conversation excerpts requested by the State were
admissible.

Mr. Cruz subsequently entered into a conditional plea agreement and

pleaded guilty to amended charges of one count of second-degree murder.

The

conditional plea reserved Mr. Cruz’s right to appeal the district court’s decisions made
before the plea.

The district court imposed a unified sentence of forty years, with

eighteen years fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Cruz asserts the district court abused its discretion when it
allowed the admission of two of the phone conversation excerpts from the State’s
motion in limine.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
When Mr. Cruz was at his home in Heyburn, Jared McNeil and Craig Short
arrived there by car. (Supp. R., p.13.)1 While in or near the garage, Mr. Cruz shot
Mr. Short three times with a pistol, and Mr. Short died. (Supp. R., p.13.) Mr. McNeil
witnessed the shooting. (Supp. R., p.13.) Mr. Cruz tried to prevent Mr. McNeil from
leaving, but Mr. McNeil eventually left. (Supp. R., p.13.) Mr. Cruz and his girlfriend,

All citations to the “Supp. R.” refer to the 120-page PDF electronic version of the
Supplemental Record.
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Stephanie Juarez, fled to Texas. (Supp. R., p.13.) They were later taken into custody
and returned to Idaho. (Supp. R., p.13.) In a police interview, Mr. Cruz reported he had
consumed methamphetamine and acid the morning of the incident. (See State’s Ex. 35
(transcript of Oct. 13, 2013 interview), p.37, Ls.1-9.) In a subsequent interview with
detectives, Mr. Cruz stated he “woke up a little bit paralyzed.” (State’s Ex. 35, p.37,
Ls.11-13.)
Later, during the presentence investigation, Mr. Cruz stated he had been
sleeping in his bedroom that day, when he was awakened by a loud noise. (Supp.
R., p.14.) He saw a person, later identified as Mr. Short, stumble into his bedroom.
(Supp. R., p.14.) Mr. Cruz quickly got up and retrieved a pistol from his dresser. (Supp.
R., p.14.) Mr. Short then ran out to the garage, and Mr. Cruz ran after him. (Supp.
R., p.14.) When Mr. Cruz reached the garage, he fired the pistol at Mr. Short, who was
running outside. (Supp. R., p.14.) Mr. Short stopped at the driver’s side door of the car
and turned around. (Supp. R., p.14.) Mr. Cruz fired the pistol until it ran out of bullets.
(Supp. R., p.14.)

Mr. Cruz then saw Mr. McNeil and asked him for help.

(Supp.

R., p.14.) Although Mr. Cruz attempted to make him stay, Mr. McNeil ran away. (Supp.
R., p.14.)
Conversely, in the preliminary hearing in this case, Mr. McNeil testified he and
Mr. Short went to Mr. Cruz’s home to pick up a bag of clothing. (Supp. R., p.13.) While
Mr. Short waited outside the home, Mr. Cruz met Mr. McNeil and let him in to get the
bag of clothing. (Supp. R., p.13.) When Mr. McNeil walked out, he noticed a speaker in
the garage that belonged to him and told Mr. Cruz he was going to take the speaker.
(Supp. R., p.13.) Mr. Cruz stated that was fine. (Supp. R., p.13.) Mr. McNeil took the
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speaker out to the car, and he heard a gunshot as he was moving items in the car to
make room for the speaker. (Supp. R., p.13). Mr. McNeil looked up and saw Mr. Cruz
shoot Mr. Short multiple times with a pistol. (Supp. R., p.13.) Mr. McNeil testified
Mr. Cruz then pointed the pistol at him and tried to shoot, but the pistol was out of
bullets. (Supp. R., p.13.) Despite Mr. Cruz’s attempts to stop him, Mr. McNeil ran
away. (Supp. R., p.14.)
The State charged Mr. Cruz by Information with one count of first-degree murder,
felony, Idaho Code §§ 18-4001, 18-4002 and 18-4003, one count of attempted firstdegree murder, felony, I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003 and 18-306, and a deadly
weapon sentencing enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-2520.

(R., pp.74-79; see

R., pp.177-82.) Mr. Cruz entered a not guilty plea to all counts. (R., pp.89-90.)
The State later filed a motion in limine, requesting the district court determine
Mr. Cruz’s statements in certain jail telephone conversations were admissible into
evidence pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) as statements made by a partyopponent. (R., pp.208-10.) The State ultimately requested the district court determine
statements in seven excerpts from Mr. Cruz’s phone conversations were admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2). (R., pp.278-80; see R., pp.240-42.)
Mr. Cruz filed an objection to the State’s motion in limine.

(R., pp.218-22.)

Among his arguments, Mr. Cruz asserted if the statements were determined to be
relevant, they were unduly prejudicial. (R., pp.220-21.)
At a hearing the district court conducted on the State’s motion in limine, the
district court addressed Excerpt No. 4 from Mr. Cruz’s jail telephone conversations,
which was as follows:
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Christopher Cruz: I know what happened too.
Christina Cruz [Mr. Cruz’s mother]: Well, I don’t believe you were there by
yourself. The whole world believes what I believe, and that’s because
they know you. You’re sticking up for somebody, and I think that’s bullshit.
Christopher Cruz: Well, wait until you see the evidence. Wait till you see
what kind of monster I am deep down inside.
Christina Cruz: You are not a monster. Did you hear me?
(Tr. D-1699, Oct. 23, 2013, p.8, Ls.3-13; see Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.40, Ls.1-11;
R., p.328.)2
The State argued the above “basically is Mr. Cruz characterizing his actions
based on the evidence that will be presented that he thinks will be presented at the time
of trial.” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.40, Ls.16-20.) The State further argued Mr. Cruz was
characterizing “his consciousness of guilt and talking directly about the evidence to his
mother . . . .” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.40, Ls.21-24.)
Regarding excerpt No. 4, Mr. Cruz’s defense counsel was concerned with unfair
prejudice: “Mr. Cruz stating that he is a monster, we have grave concerns that if a jury
hears that, they are going to automatically convict. They are going to conclude that the
charge of first degree murder is true and accurate, which we don’t believe it is.”
(Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.41, Ls.6-13.)

After asserting the statement was not relevant,

defense counsel asked, “[a]re we going to have a conviction based on statement rather
than evidence, Your Honor? So we would, as strong as possible, object to that of unfair

At the hearing, the State explained the program it used to print the jail telephone
conversation transcripts set off the pagination, meaning there was confusion about the
page numbers. (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.34, Ls.5-15.) Like the district court (e.g.,
Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.29, L.21 – p.30, L.15, p.33, Ls.18-33), this brief will refer to the page
numbers at the center bottom of the pages in the phone conversation transcripts.
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prejudice.” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.41, Ls.15-22.) Defense counsel further asserted, “[a]nd
if my client’s going to be convicted, we would like to see it be done on the evidence and
not that statement, Your Honor.” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.41, Ls.23-25.)
The district court determined Excerpt No. 4 was relevant. (See Tr., Dec. 5, 2014,
p.42, Ls.2-4.)

While the district court stated “it does run the risk of being unfairly

prejudicial because it could be just an offhand comment,” the district court then
determined “[t]he real gist of this proffer from the state is that at line 9 and line 10 where
Mr. Cruz states, ‘Well, wait until you see the evidence.’ That is the real essence of this.”
(Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.42, Ls.8-13.)

The district court determined Mr. Cruz’s

“characterization of the evidence is less important, although it does show his, or it may
be argued that it shows his, consciousness of the magnitude of his conduct.”
(Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.42, Ls.13-17.)

The district court thought “on balance, it is

prejudicial, but I don’t think it’s unfairly prejudicial. It is his own statement, and so the
state may present this segment which we’ve marked as No. 4 as presented.”
(Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.42, Ls.18-21; see R. p.328.)
The district court also addressed Excerpt No. 6 from Mr. Cruz’s jail telephone
conversations, which was as follows:
Christopher Cruz: . . . [T]here’s a lot of inconsistencies with me too. Well,
I pretty much said pretty much the truth, but I justified all my actions. Like,
I said I was under the influence at first, but they have my blood anyway, so
they could do the test that I wasn’t on methamphetamines, or I didn’t have
it in my blood system or other different types of drugs besides THC. But I
admitted to that, I smoke pot every now and then sometimes. It’s no
big deal.
(Tr. D-1705, Nov. 21, 2013, p.6, L.6 – p.7, L.14; see Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.45, L.13 –
p.46, L.2, R., p.329.)
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The State argued Mr. Cruz was “specifically speaking about the incident. He is
specifically speaking about how he lied to justify his actions. How he wasn’t originally
on drugs or he wasn’t on drugs during the murder. And he is stating he wasn’t on drugs
during the murder.” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.46, Ls.9-14.)
Mr. Cruz objected on the basis of “relevance [and] unfair prejudice.” (Tr., Dec. 5,
2014, p.46, L.21.) Additionally, Mr. Cruz’s defense counsel raised concerns regarding
the “last two sentences about the possible drug use, again, I think the Court has to look
at [Rule] 404(b). If he is going to be convicted, it needs to be what is presented and not
for allegations or his statements that he recreationally used marijuana every now and
then.” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.46, L.24 – p.47, L.2.) Defense counsel asserted “that
statement should be stricken.” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, Ls.2-4.)
Defense counsel further asserted that if Mr. Cruz “testified or told the detective
this information, the detective should be the one testifying, not this, Your Honor.”
(Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, Ls.5-7.) In response to the district court’s questions, the State
related that Mr. Cruz, in an interview with the detectives, “stated that he was high on
acid, and then he took a needle of meth and shot up and got even higher so he was at a
paralyzed state I believe he stated.” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, Ls.8-16.) The State also
answered that Excerpt No. 6 would directly contradict what Mr. Cruz told the detectives
in the interview. (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, Ls.17-20.)
The district court then determined Excerpt No. 6 was relevant. (Tr., Dec. 5,
2014, p.47, Ls.22-25.) The district court also determined “it is prejudicial, but not unduly
prejudicial. They are statements made both in this instance and in the interview with the
detectives by the defendant and they relate to his statements that appear to have been
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offered initially in the interview with the detectives as justification regarding his conduct
or his alleged conduct.” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, L.25 – p.48, L.7.) Thus, the district
court determined “No. 6 is admissible, and will be able to be presented to the jury if the
state wishes to do so.” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.48, Ls.8-10; see R., p.329.)
Additionally, the district court determined the other five jail telephone
conversation excerpts were admissible because they were relevant and their probative
value was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (R., pp.326-30.)
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, Mr. Cruz later agreed to plead guilty to
amended charges of one count of second-degree murder, felony, I.C. §§ 18-4001, 184002 and 18-4003. (R., pp.331-50.) The State agreed to dismiss the attempted firstdegree murder count and the deadly weapon sentencing enhancement. (R., p.340.)
Mr. Cruz reserved his “right to appeal any decisions of trial court made prior to entry of
plea.” (R., p.341.) The district court later imposed a unified sentence of forty years,
with eighteen years fixed. (R., pp.413-15.)
Mr. Cruz filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction and Order of Commitment. (R., pp.421-24.)
Mr. Cruz also filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal
Rule 35.

(Supp. R., pp.19-32.)

The district court entered an Order Denying the

Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35.
(Supp. R., pp.12-18.) On appeal, Mr. Cruz does not challenge the district court’s denial
of his Rule 35 motion.
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ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed the admission of Excerpt No. 4
and Excerpt No. 6?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed The Admission Of Excerpt
No. 4 And Excerpt No. 6
A.

Introduction
Mr. Cruz asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the

admission of Excerpt No. 4 and Excerpt No. 6, because it did not act consistently with
the applicable legal standards. The district court abused its discretion when it allowed
Excerpt No. 4, because the danger of unfair prejudice from Mr. Cruz’s characterization
of himself as a “monster” substantially outweighed the statement’s probative value
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. The district court abused its discretion when it
allowed Excerpt No. 6, because it did not articulate a non-propensity purpose for the
admission of the statements on Mr. Cruz’s other acts of drug use under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 404(b).

Thus, the district court’s order allowing the admission of the jail

telephone conversation excerpts should be reversed with respect to Excerpt No. 4 and
Excerpt No. 6, Mr. Cruz’s judgment of conviction should be vacated, and the case
should be remanded to the district court.
B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
A district court has broad discretion when ruling on a motion in limine, and an

appellate court reviews the district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion in limine
for abuse of discretion. State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, 528 (2014). When a
district court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the district court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the district court acted within the
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boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to
the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the district court reached its decision by
an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
In its motion in limine, the State sought to admit Mr. Cruz’s statements in Excerpt
No. 4 and Excerpt No. 6 as statements of a party-opponent under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 801(d)(2). (E.g,, R., pp.278-79.) Statements of a party-opponent are not
hearsay. I.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A). But nonhearsay evidence, like statements of a partyopponent, “may be excluded on other grounds, such as if [it] constitutes propensity
evidence under I.R.E. 404(b).” See Cook v. State, 157 Idaho 775, 779 (Ct. App. 2014).
Relevant evidence is generally admissible. I.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if it
has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. I.R.E. 401. However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury. I.R.E. 403; State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52 (2009). An
appellate court reviews a Rule 403 balancing determination by the district court for an
abuse of discretion. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.
Additionally, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person to show action in conformity therewith, but may be admissible
for other purposes. I.R.E. 404(b). Admissibility of other acts evidence when offered for
a permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered analysis. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. First,
the district court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish the
other act as fact. Id. The district court must also determine if the fact, if established,
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would be relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged, other
than propensity. Id. Second, the district court must engage in a Rule 403 balancing
and determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the
probative value of the evidence. Id. As discussed above, this balancing is committed to
the discretion of the district court. Id. The district court must determine each of these
considerations of admissibility on a case-by-case basis. Id.
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Excerpt No. 4,
Because Under Rule 403 The Danger Of Unfair Prejudice Substantially
Outweighed The Statement’s Probative Value
Mr. Cruz asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the

admission of Excerpt No. 4, because under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 the danger of
unfair prejudice from Mr. Cruz’s characterization of himself as a “monster” substantially
outweighed the statement’s probative value.
Excerpt No. 4 included Mr. Cruz’s statement:

“Well, wait until you see the

evidence. Wait till you see what kind of monster I am deep down inside.” (Tr., D-1699,
p.8, Ls.9-11.) Although Mr. Cruz raised concerns with unfair prejudice (Tr., Dec. 5,
2014, p.41, Ls.6-25), and the district court initially noted “it does run the risk of being
unfairly prejudicial because it could be just an offhand comment,” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014,
p.42, Ls.8-10), the district court ultimately determined “on balance, it is prejudicial, but I
don’t think it’s unfairly prejudicial.” (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.42, Ls.18-20.) However, the
danger of unfair prejudice from the statement substantially outweighed the statement’s
probative value.
As explained above, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. I.R.E. 403. The Idaho
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Supreme Court has held that “[t]he fact that evidence may cause an emotional reaction
in the jury does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the evidence should be
excluded.” State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 67 (2011). The proper focus of the district
court is not upon merely prejudicial evidence but upon unfair prejudice; “whether fact to
be shown by the evidence justifies the tendency of the evidence to persuade by
illegitimate means.” State v. Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 604 (1991) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Thus, “evidence should be excluded if it invites inordinate appeal to
lines of reasoning outside of the evidence or emotions which are irrelevant to the
decision making process.” Id.
Here, the probative value of Mr. Cruz’s statement characterizing himself as a
“monster” was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, because it
invited inordinate appeal to lines of reasoning outside of the evidence and to emotions
which are irrelevant to the decision making process. See id. As Mr. Cruz’s defense
counsel asserted, if the jury heard the statement, “they are going to automatically
convict.” (See Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.41, Ls.9-11.) The statement would prompt the jury
to convict Mr. Cruz on his self-description, not on the evidence presented by the State.
(See Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.41, Ls.11-13, 19-20.) Thus, even though the statement may
have been relevant to Mr. Cruz’s characterization of the evidence and consciousness of
guilt (see Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.42, Ls.4-17), on balance the facts to be shown by the
statement did not justify the tendency of the statement to persuade by illegitimate
means. Cf. Rhoades, 119 Idaho at 604.
The probative value of Mr. Cruz’s statement characterizing himself as a
“monster” was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See I.R.E.
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403. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the admission of
Excerpt No. 4, because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards.
See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.
D.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Allowed Excerpt No. 6,
Because It Did Not Articulate Under Rule 404(b) A Non-Propensity Purpose For
The Admission Of The Statements On Mr. Cruz’s Other Acts Of Drug Use
Mr. Cruz asserts the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the

admission of Excerpt No. 6, because it did not articulate under Idaho Rule of Evidence
404(b) a non-propensity purpose for the admission of the statements on Mr. Cruz’s
other acts of drug use.
Excerpt No. 6 included Mr. Cruz’s statement that he admitted to having THC in
his blood system, followed by: “I smoke pot every now and then sometimes. It’s no big
deal.” (Tr., D-1705, p.7, Ls.11-14.) At the hearing on the State’s motion in limine,
Mr. Cruz asserted the district court had to look at Rule 404(b) with respect to those two
statements. (Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.46, Ls.21-24.) However, the district court determined
the entirety of Excerpt No. 6 was admissible, without striking the statements as Mr. Cruz
had requested. (See Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, L.22 – p.48, L.10.) Further, the district
court did not articulate under Rule 404(b) a non-propensity purpose for the admission of
the statements on Mr. Cruz’s other acts of drug use. (See Tr., Dec. 5, 2014, p.47, L.22
– p.48, L.10; R., p.328.)
As a preliminary matter, evidence of Mr. Cruz’s other acts of drug use, because it
implicated Mr. Cruz’s character and was not intrinsic to the crimes charged, was subject
to the strictures of Rule 404(b). See State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945, 949 (Ct. App.
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2012).

Thus, the district court needed to conduct a full Rule 404(b) admissibility

analysis on the other acts of drug use statements. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.
For the second step of the first tier in the Rule 404(b) admissibility analysis—the
determination that the other act would be relevant—the trial court must articulate the
purpose or purposes, other than propensity, for admission of the evidence. In Grist, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that the district court, when it admitted other acts evidence,
did not “articulate whether the evidence was probative because it demonstrated the
existence of a common scheme or plan or because it tended to otherwise corroborate [a
complaining witness’] testimony.”3 Grist, 147 Idaho at 53. Because “trial courts must
carefully scrutinize evidence offered as ‘corroboration’ or as demonstrating a ‘common
scheme or plan’ in order to avoid the erroneous introduction of evidence that is merely
probative of the defendant’s propensity to engage in criminal behavior,” the Grist Court
vacated the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Id.; cf.
State v. Marks, 156 Idaho 559, 565 (Ct. App. 2014) (“Here, the district court identified
the purposes, permissible under Rule 404(b), for which it found the evidence relevant.”)
Because the district court in this case did not articulate a non-propensity purpose
for admission of the statements on Mr. Cruz’s other acts of drug use, the district court
did not satisfy the second step of the first tier in the Rule 404(b) admissibility analysis.
See Grist, 147 Idaho at 53; see also State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 230 (2008)
(holding, with respect to the notice requirement of Rule 404(b), that “compliance with
I.R.E. 404(b) is mandatory and a condition precedent to admission of other acts

The district court in Grist also “did not determine whether there was sufficient evidence
to establish as fact [the defendant’s] prior uncharged sexual misconduct . . . .” Grist,
147 Idaho at 53.
3
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evidence”). Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the admission
of Excerpt No. 6, because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards.
See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Cruz respectfully requests this Court reverse the
district court’s order allowing the admission of the jail telephone conversation excerpts
with respect to Excerpt No. 4 and Excerpt No. 6, vacate Mr. Cruz’s judgment of
conviction, and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 2nd day of August, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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